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China has both the world's largest population (1.008 billion, according to the census carried 
out in that country in 1982) and perhaps the most strict and systematic family planning program. 
Concerted family planning efforts began in the People's Republic of China during the mid-1950s 
but were periodically disrupted by political campaigns, particularly the "Great Leap Forward" in 
1958-60 and the Cultural Revolution of 1966-69. Since 1970, however, there has been a 
sustained and increasingly ambitious effort to lower the number of babies born.1 Initially this 
drive involved the use of a variety of mechanisms and sanctions to try to foster late marriage and 
to get urban couples to have only two children, and rural parents three children. Even though, as 
we will detail shortly, this family planning effort was very successful in reducing China's birth 
rate, the authorities decided in 1979 that even more strict measures were needed to deal with the 
population problem. They were influenced in part by projections of the increasing numbers of 
young people, products of a "baby boom" in the early 1960s, who would soon be entering the 
marriageable ages. An expected "marriage boom" was likely to push the birth rate back up and 
keep China from keeping below its proclaimed "target population" in the year 2000 of 1.2 billion. 
In response, the authorities initiated a new "one child" family planning p r ~ g r a m . ~  Young 
couples would be encouraged to make a pledge to have only one child, regardless of sex. Those 
who made the pledge would be issued "one child certificates," and these would entitle them to a 
variety of benefits, including pay bonuses, extended paid maternity leave, and promised 
preference in later schooling and job-placement for that child. Those parents who did not take the 
pledge, and particularly thosewho went ahead and had a third or higher parity child, would suffer 
a comparable range of penalties, as would their children. Couples who received the certificate but 
who subsequently went ahead and had another child were liable for repayment of the value of all 
of the benefits already received under the program. Parents who were already past the one child 
target were to be induced by any means possible not to have more children, preferably by having 
1. No systematic account of the various family planning efforts in China will be offered here. Readers should consult, among other 
works, H. Yuan Tien, China's Population Struggle, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969; Pi-chao Chen and Adrienne Kols, 
"Population and Birth Planning in the People's Republic of China," Population Reports, Vol. X, no. 1, Jan.-Feb. 1982. 
2. We use the term "one child program" as a shorthand reference, even though this phrase oversimplifies the nature of the family 
planning policy recently. 
one of them sterilized. Since 1979 a Chinese-style campaign to enforce the one child program has 
been underway, with a peak of family planning enforcement efforts being reached in 1983. Since 
then there has been a slight easing of the policy, and a very modest increase in the circumstances 
under which a t  least rural parents can receive approval to have a second child, but the one child 
policy has not been ~ i t h d r a w n . ~  
Many interesting issues are raised by the Chinese family planning efforts, and by the one 
child program in particular. To what extent is it possible, as  the Chinese program attempts, to 
produce very low fertility levels not by transition to an advanced industrial society but by an 
administered birth control enforcement progra~n?~ To what extent has the "one child" program 
been effective? Insofar as the policy has been effective, is this simply due to the vigor of 
enforcement, rather than public acceptance, so that if that enforcement effort was removed a 
dramatic new "baby boom" would occur? Or have the authorities been able to induce changes in 
the childbearing desires of the Chinese population, so that the traditional features of this 
population--a strong value on large families and a strong preference for sons--are no longer visible? 
Or to put it in simpler terms, how acceptable or unacceptable to the population is the current one 
child policy? 
One other question involves the relationship between the one child policy and China's "four 
modernizations" reform effort launched in 1978. While China's leaders make every effort to 
stress the close links between family planning and the reforms, with reduced population growth 
making it easier to increase income levels, there is a t  least one aspect of the reforms that is in 
3. Again, there is not space enough here to present a full discussion of the one child campaign. A good general overview is provided 
in E. Croll, D. Davin, and P, Kane, eds., China's One-Child Family Policy, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. On the subsequent 
modest easing of the campaign, see Susan Greenhalgh, "Shifts in China's Population Policy. 1984-86: Views from the Central, 
Provincial, and Local Levels," Population and Development Review, Vol. 12, 1986, pp. 491-515. The Chinese used the term, "open a 
small hole" to characterize this modification, since it specified a limited number of restrictive conditions under which a second 
child would be approved. In the latter part of 1986, however, official policy showed signs of reversing again, with the possibility 
that a new and stricter one child drive would be initiated. (Susan Greenhalgh, personal communication.) 
4. Many demographic authorities have argued that  only economic development can produce substantial reductions in a society's birth 
rate. and that an  attemot to oroduce such reductions administrativelv can onlv result in woular alienation and resistance. as 
occirred in India during the i970s. See, for example, Kingsley ~ a v i s ,  "~opuiation ~olic;:  ill Current Programs ~ucckd?"  
Science, no. 158, 1967, pp. 730-39; P. Van den Berghe, Human Family Systems: An Evolutionary View, New York: Elsevier, 1979. 
Cantrars arguments have also been voiced. See, for examole. Ronald heedman. "Theories of Fertilitv Decline: A Reaooraisal." 
Social Force;, Vol. 58 (1979). pp. 1-7. We are aware, of course,'that recent research has shown that  declkes in birth rate; began 
occur in some Western countries before appreciable modernization. However, these decreases were extremely small compared to 
what is being attempted in China, which involves essentially the completion of a demographic transition with only modest 
economic development. 
potential conflict with the one child policy. Prior to about 1980 China's peasants operated within 
communes, China's form of collectivized agriculture, and these organizations provided a means to 
enforce family planning and other policies. But since then the communes have been dismantled, 
and replaced by the "household responsibility system." Instead of working a s  laborers on the 
commune's fields, peasants now have reverted to working in family production units, with the 
fields divided up and "contracted out" to the various families. These peasant families generally 
&ve to deliver contracted quantities of grain or other products to the state, but after fulfilling 
their contract they can dispose of any surplus themselves. Specialization of peasant families in 
non-agricultural activities, such as handicrafts, commerce, or the food trade, is now actively 
encouraged, and a sizeable minority of peasant laborers have now left the land to engage in work 
in the towns and ~ i t i e s . ~  
This dramatic reform of China's agricultural system has several potential consequences for 
the one child program, and foreign analysts have seen most of these as harmful. For example, 
rural leaders (called "cadres" in the political jargon used) should have more difficulty now 
controlling the activities of a more footloose peasantry, including their reproductive a~t iv i t ies .~  In
addition, nouT that the peasant family is the main unit of production once again, parents should 
have an added incentive to have more children--in order to increase their family labor force and 
make possible more ambitious undertakings. (Regulations implemented as part of the rural 
reforms that limit the number of non-family members who can be hired to work in a family's 
enterprises--generally to 3 a t  most--should also reinforce this e f f e ~ t . ) ~  In other words, in the 
Chinese countryside it would appear that what the government is trying to do with one hand, 
through the one child campaign, it is undermining with the other, through the household 
5. General accounts of the household responsibility system and related reforms can be found in Thomas Bernstein, "Reforming 
China's Agriculture," unpublished conference paper. 1984; Andrew Watson, "New Structures in the Organization of Chinese 
Agriculture: A Variable Model," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 57 (1984-851, pp. 621-645; and Jonathan Unger, "The Decollectivization of the 
Chinese Countryside: A Survey of Twenty-eight Villages," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 58, 1986, pp. 585-600. 
6. Even peasants who have not left the land are no longer working under direct cadre supervision in their day-&day labor, as they 
were under the commune system. 
7. We wish to stress that these are added incentives produced by the reforms. Other structural features that produced a pronatal 
tendency even under the commune system, such as the virtually universal tendency of daughters to marry out of the household 
and the absence in all but a very few wealthy suburban locales of any sort of retirement pension system, still remain salient. 
responsibility ~ y s t e m . ~  So the final major question of interest here is the extent to which this 
analysis is correct--are the reforms undermining the one child program in the countryside? 
We will not be able to satisfactorily resolve all of these questions here. But through data 
from a number of surveys conducted in recent years in China, many of them by the Chinese co- 
authors of this article, we hope to be able to gain some insights into the way the one child program 
is working. What we will attempt to do here is to present as  much as possible of the available 
data from these recent surveys to provide descriptive information on the Chinese family planning 
program. The first section that follows briefly reviews indicators of actual trends in fertility in 
China since 1970, but in subsequent sections we will focus primarily upon data that deal with the 
preferred family size of various segments of the Chinese population. Our assumption is that such 
data give us a t  least rough, and perhaps conservative, indicators of the number of babies people 
would like to have.g The emphasis here will remain a t  the level of description and rather simple 
analysis because that is all that is possible a t  the moment; the original data upon which to carry 
out more complex kinds of analyses are not available yet outside of China. 
China's Fertility Transition 
In terms of standard economic indicators, China still remains quite an underdeveloped 
country. Her estimated GNP per capita in 1984 of US$3 10 placed China in the upper ranges of 
the low income countries of the world.1° However, in terms of birth and fertility rates, China now 
looks very different from other low income countries. Birth rates fluctuated erratically during the 
1950s and 1960s, but the decade of the 1970s saw a precipitous decline in the childbearing rates 
of China's population. Table 1 presents figures on the total fertility rate in China for selected 
8. The urban reforms have produced so far only a small number of new household production units, with the vast bulk of urbanites 
still employed by large-scale organizations. So the potential conflict between the reforms and the one child policy should not be so 
apparent in China's cities. 
9. Given the presence and constant official publicity for the one child campaign, and risks involved in opposing it publicly, one may 
wonder whether people responded to questions about their preferred number of children honestly. We assume, therefore, that there 
may be some understating of true preferences, and hence a conservative bias in our figures. However, as will soon become 
apparent, the studies reported here do not show people simply responding tha t  their preference is to have only one child. It might 
also be noted that  including preferred family size measures in a questionnaire is still somewhat d*cult to do in China One 
Western researcher who was given permission to conduct a local fertility survey in China in 1981 was told that  his preferred 
family size questions had to be taken out or the study would not proceed. 
10. The World Bank, World Development Report 1986, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 180. 
years since 1950. These numbers tell a dramatic story. In 1970 the total fertility rate, an 
estimate of how many children a woman would have in her lifetime based upon fertility behavior 
in that year, was no lower than the figure for 1950. Over the next decade there was a drop of 
more than 60% in the total fertility rate and, in spite of recent fluctuations, low levels of fertility 
have been 'maintained. In the 1980s China's birth rate figures resemble those from developed 
countries much more than those from lower income countries." Given China's still low level of 
development, and sluggsh economic performance in the 1970s, it is clear that this dramatic 
transformation cannot have been produced by economic modernization. At least a major part of 
the explanation of this "early demographic transition" must lie in China's family planning 
campaign. l2 
Table 1 about here 
This dramatic change in fertility behavior has sometimes been interpreted in the West as a 
result of the "one child campaign." However, it is clear from the figures in Table 1 that this is 
not the case. The substantial reduction in fertility preceded the introduction of the one child policy 
in 1979, and that policy, as  indicated earlier, was more an effort to keep the birth rate from 
shooting back upward. Some commentators have also assumed that because of this campaign, 
now and in the future most Chinese will only be able to have a single child. However, in spite of 
the vigor with which the campaign has been enforced, about half of all births in recent years have 
been second or higher parity children, as  the figures in Table 2 show. There are no figures 
available for 1983 which was, as indicated earlier, the "high tide" of enforcement of the one child 
program. But the figures in the table do indicate rising compliance with the one child program in 
the early 1980s, but a modest relaxation, and somewhat more higher parity births,by 1985. This 
table also illustrates again the gap between the behavior of urbanites and villagers. In 1982 an 
11. Table 1 tells another story a s  well. In earlier years there was only a small difference between rural and urban fertility rates, and 
indeed in 1960 the urban rate was higher-no doubt a consequence of the way in which the Great Leap-induced famine was more 
severely felt in the countryside. But in recent times rural fertility rates have been about twice the urban rates. So the "town and 
country gap" in fertility behavior has widened during this period. 
12. See also W .  R.  Lavely, "The Rural Chinese Fertility Transition: A Report from Shifang Xian, Sichuan," Population Studies, Vol. 
38, 1984, pp. 365-84. 
extraordinary 93% of all babies born in urban China were first births, but in no year (with the 
possible exception of the missing year, 1983) did China's villagers have more than 51% first 
births.13 In sum, in spite of the vigor of the Chinese family planning effort in general, and of the 
"one child campaign" in particular, only about half of the babies born in recent years were, in fact, 
first children.14 A dramatic fertility transition has occurred in China, and it has occurred prior to 
substantial economic development, but there is still much less than full compliance with the one 
child goal the gwernment has stressed in recent years. 
Table 2 about here 
How Many Children Do Chinese Want to Have? 
The figures presented above make it clear that Chinese are having many fewer children 
today than they were a decade or more ago. What is not clear, however, is whether this change 
has been the result simply of massive government pressure and enforcement, or whether people 
have begun to desire fewer children than in the past. A major part of the family planning progam 
has been the effort to persuade the population that traditional attitudes such as "the more children 
the better" and "more sons, more prosperity" are outmoded, and that "fewer is better." Since 
1979, of course, this persuasion effort has tried to argue for acceptance of the norm that one child 
is enough, no matter whether the child is a boy or a girl. To what extent has this educational 
effort had an effect? 
No definitive answer to this question is possible here. But we think some insights into the 
question can be gained by examining the results of various local studies that have been conducted ~ 
in China in recent years which inquired about preferred family size. The procedures used in these 
studies varied somewhat and were often less than ideal. For example, strict probability sampling 
13. It may be objected that there may be some biases in such statistics from China because of the official family planning propam. 
However, even modest levels of under- and overstatement would not substantially alter the conclusions offer* here. 
14. I t  should be noted, though, that in comparative perspective these figures on percentages of first births are very high, particularly 
in view of China's low level of economic development. In 1982 in Taiwan only 38% of the babies born were first births, and in 1981 
in the United States the comparable figure was only 43%. See Ronald Reedman. Xiao Zhenyu, Li Bohua, and William Lavely, 
"Lccal Area Variations in Reproductive Behavior in the People's Republic of China, 1973-1982," unpublished paper, p. 5. 
procedures were not used in most studies, the exact wording of the questions varied somewhat, 
and, the populations a re 'no t  always comparable. Perhaps more important, given the official 
nature of the one child policy and the lack of guarantees of confidentiality, one might expect that 
respondents in these surveys would understate their family size preferences. Finally, in several 
cases not enough information is presented in the sources available to us  to be sure what methods 
were used.15 In spite of such problems with the data to be reported here, we still think they are of 
.. considerable interest. 
Table 3 about here 
In Table 3 we present the results from a variety of family size preference surveys in 
different locales in China. In general the question used was something like, "How many children 
do you feel it is best to have?" Except where noted, the respondents were generally women of 
childbearing age (15-49). Several conclusions can be drawn from the figures in the table. First, 
with the exception of the 1980 survey of soldiers in Beijing and the 1984 urban survey in Zhejiang 
province, in no case did a majority of respondents reply that having one child was the best, and in 
many rural areas only a small minority favored one child. On the other hand, with the exception 
of the minority area in Guizhou Province and the fishing village in Fujian Province, in none of the 
studies did a majority of the respondents say they preferred three or more children. Or to put 
things in another way, with a few exceptions it appears that in both rural and urban areas two 
children is the most commonly stated preference, rather than either the officially espoused one 
child or the traditional large family. The figures in the table also testify to other expected features 
of family size preferences. In general family size preferences seem to be somewhat higher in rural 
than in urban areas, and the highest figures of all come from the minority area studied in 
Guizhou. l6 
15. This last feature is characteristic of many Chinese survey reports in recent years. Publications present results but are often 
silent about the methods used to produce those results. As more Chinese social scientists receive high level methodological 
training we can hope that this situation will change. 
16. Minority groups have been a t  least partly exempted from meeting the official family planning program goals, so people living in 
minority areas have been exposed to less birth control propaganda than have Han Chinese. The high levels shown for the Fujian 
fishing community may be due to a combination of the marginal and low-status nature of fishermen in China traditionally and 
the fact that it is hard to do family planning work among people who are not sedentary. 
Table 4 about here 
These sorts of regional variations in preferred family size can be seen more clearly in the 
figures in Table 4. The figures reported there come from surveys conducted in various parts of 
Hubei Province by students in training classes run by Gu Shengzu. Teams of students went to 
the counties listed and carried out surveys of the women of child-bearing age in a non-random but 
diverse selection of rural brigades in each county.17 These figures again reveal that few 
respondents mentioned one child as their preference, and that two children was almost always the 
predominant choice. But the degree of acceptance of two children as  the best family size varies 
widely. In the most developed counties included, more than three-quarters of all respondents said 
that two children were best. But in outlying, less developed, and hilly or minority-group counties, 
considerable numbers of respondents favored three or more children, and in mountainous 
Chongyang County more than 70% of those interviewed wanted a t  least three children. 
The figures reviewed in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that while there may have been marked 
success in promoting the idea that small families are good, still there has been less success (at 
least outside of the army) in gaining acceptance of the idea that having only one child is 
desirable.ls Still, if people could be induced to want two and only two children this would be a 
considerable accomplishment. Indeed, some analysts argue that if there were appropriate spacing 
between children, the same low national population growth rate the government is trying to 
achieve with its one child policy could be achieved with people having two chi-ldren.'g Does this 
17. Brigades are units within the commune system that generally correspond to large villages. Although formally the communes 
have now been disbanded, the term brigade is still often used in referring to the village level of rural administration. In selection 
of brigades, the main concern was to see that the economic and terrain variations within each county were represented. 
Generally all of the women in the brigade were interviewed. 
18. We assume that the figures in these tables represent considerable reductions from the family size preferences that Chinese would 
have chosen in earlier decades or centuries, although we lack earlier family size preference surveys to prove this point. We do 
know that in studies of women of child-bearing ages in Taiwan the mean number preferred has dropped from about 4 in the 
mid-1960s to just under 3 May-in other words, to a level higher than reported in most communities studied in the Mainland. 
See Ming-Cheng Chang, Ronald heedman. and Te-Hsiung Sun, "Trends in Fertility, Family Size Preferences, and Family 
Planning Practice: Taiwan, 1961-80," Studies in Family Planning, Vol. 12, 1981, p. 217. In addition, a survey of 210 women aged 
50-81 in four Hubei counties in 1981 found that these women, who on the average had borne 6.5 children, responded with an 
average preferred number of children of 4.1. In other words, these responses hint that even older women would prefer to have 
somewhat fewer children than they have actually had, implying some success in inducing a reduction in preferred family sites. 
See Gu Shengtu, "An Exploration into Rural Fertility Desires," (in Chinese), Shehuixue Yanjiu, (Sociological Research), no. 5, 
1986. 
19. See John Bongaarts and Susan Greenhalgh, "An Alternative to the One-Child Policy in China," Population and Development 
Review, Vol. 11, 1985, pp. 588617. -
mean, then, that i t  should be possible soon to relax the administrative enforcement of the one child 
policy, since most people in China would be quite willing to stop a t  two children? 
There are reasons to doubt that the matter is so simple. For one thing, of course, there is 
the fact that we suspect there may be some systematic understating of family size preferences in 
these studies, so that "true" answers would reveal a higher percentage of third or higher parity 
preferences. But an additional problem involves the fact that these data all concern simply 
q; 
statements about what is the best number of children, with nothing specified about the gender of 
those children. Clearly in any population feelings about how .many children are best are 
contingent upon what the sexes of the existing child or children are. There have only been a few 
studies in China which have asked about family size preferences with the various gender and 
parity possibilities specified, but those studies that have been conducted tell an interesting story. 
Table 5 about here 
In Table 5 we present results from interviews carried out in 1986 in rural and urban areas 
of Danjiang County, one of the well developed counties in Hubei Province included in the data 
described in Table 4. The respondents were 750 men and women in selected rural areas of that 
county and 350 men and women in urban areas of that county. The data in the table reveal that 
in both rural and urban areas less than a quarter of the respondents claimed that they preferred 
to have two children, no matter what the sexes of those children were. The overwhelming - 
preference for two children, a s  far as most people interviewed in this study went, meant a 
preference for a boy and a girl. In other words, even if we don't assume understatement of family 
size preferences in this study and in others, we have to conclude that most of those who had had 
two boys or two girls (as well a s  those with only one child) would be unhappy with their 
s i t u a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Biology being what it is, a nicely matched pair with a boy and a girl cannot be 
g ~ a r a n t e e d . ~ ~  On the average about half of those who have a second child will not have had one 
of each sex, and some portion of them are likely to want to go on and have a third child. Indeed, 
one analysis using the 1982 one-in-one-thousand fertility survey data calculated that, a t  the rates 
of fertility that existed in 1981, about 48% of the women who had had two boys could be expected 
to go on and have a third child, while about 76% of the women who had had two girls could be 
expected to go on and have a third So the least acceptable situation is to end up with two 
daughters, but a considerable share of those who have had two sons are likely to want to try to 
right the balance by trying again for a daughter. I t  would be misleading, then, to conclude that 
the modal family size preference, as  revealed in Chinese survey data, is two children. Instead, the 
most common situation seems to be a desire to have a t  least one son and a t  least one daughter. 
Given this sort of underlying preference, a considerable number of families could be expected to 
have not only two but even three or four children, if there were not inducements in the family 
planning program that inhibited them from doing so. 
Ideal Family Size and the Chinese Rural Reforms 
The data reviewed so far indicate little underlying support for having only one child, and 
even some difficulties making a two child limit, regardless of the sex of the children, acceptable. I t  
seems apparent that, without the administrative measures of the family planning program, many 
people would go ahead and have a second or even a third or fourth Does this suggest, 
then, a sort of demographic "pressure cooker," in which an accumulation of suppressed 
childbearing desires could break out if allowed to? Or are there reasons to think that over time 
the problem will be eased as more and more Chinese shift to lower family size preferences? Again 
20. Similar conclusions can be reached from another survey of the family size preferences of young people surveyed in seven Chinese 
cities in 1983. See Current State of Young Workers in Contemporary China, (in Chinese), Beiiing: Workers' Press, 1984. 
21. Prenatal testing to determine the gender of the child is rarely available in China, but if i t  becomes available interesting questions 
and problems will be raised. 
22. See Griffith Feeney, Yu Jingyuan, and Chi-hsien Tuan, "Parity Progression Measures of Fertility in China," unpublished paper, 
1985, p. 17. 
23. This statement assumes that many people would be able to have more children-i.e. that they wouldn't have been sterilized. This 
seems a safe assumption. To our knowledge, sterilization is not advocated or practiced after one child, but only after a second 
child, and with increasing vigor after higher parity births. Overall in 1982 the percentage of all contraceptive use that involved 
sterilization was 36%. which is lower than the figure for the United States-41% for all married women 15-44 in 1981. See R. 
Freedman, et al., op. c i t ,  p. 6. 
we cannot offer a definitive answer to these questions here. But by analyzing recent social trends 
in China and their demographic implications, we hope to be able to offer some preliminary 
thoughts on the issue. 
Discussing the implications of social trends is fundamentally a matter of considering what is 
happening in the Chinese countryside. Urban areas constitute only about 20% of China's total 
population, and we have already seen that both fertility and family size preferences are 
substantially lower in the cities than in rural areas. Indeed, everything we know about urban life 
in China suggests that it presents an environment that is decidedly favorable to low fertility, and 
even to the one child family.24 The social structure of Chinese villages is quite different, however, 
and seems likely to foster at least moderately high fertility. And the reforms that have 
dismantled collectivized agriculture in rural China and revived family farming have been seen by 
many analysts as leading to even higher fertility aspirations, a s  we noted a t  the beginning of this 
article. However, a number of articles published in China present a contrary view.25 These 
articles argue that rather than conflicting head-on with official family planning goals, the rural 
reforms are actually contributing to a lowering of fertility aspirations, thus making it easier in the 
future to realize the goals of the one child campaign. We wish to summarize this second set of 
arguments here and see to what extent they are supported by the available local survey data. 
As we discussed earlier, the advocates of the "pronatal impact of the rural reforms" 
argument contend that the restoration of the peasant family as  a production unit fosters higher 
fertility, both by giving families stronger reasons for wanting to build up a large and differentiated 
family labor force and by making the supervision of peasant lives and activities (including 
childbearing) more indirect and difficult., The contrary set of arguments about the "anti-natal 
impact of the rural reforms" is quite different. These arguments focus not on the operation of 
family farms, but on the general economic and opinion trends that the rural reforms have 
24. See the discussion in Martin K. Whyte and William L. Parish, Urban Life in Contemporary China, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1984, pp. 160-67. 
25. See, for example, Mu Aipin, "A Family's Smallness is its Strength," Beijing Review, no. 48, Dec. 1, 1986, pp. 19-20. 
unleashed. Essentially these arguments pin their hopes on a modernization of fertility 
aspirations--on trying to get peasants to think about the number of children to have in a manner 
that has long been associated with urbanites, but not with peasants. 
Under the reform policies, becoming wealthy is officially encouraged, and conspicuous 
consumption is no longer frowned upon, as it was when Mao Zedong was alive. The mass media 
are full of articles about peasants buying televisions, sewing machines, and trucks and building 
fancy new houses. Press accounts of the "specialized households" and "10,000 yuan households" 
who are prospering in the reform era do not, for obvious reasons, stress their successful 
mobilization of a large family labor force. Instead, in addition to hard work, emphasis is placed 
upon education and technical skills as the primary ways to rise above the lot of an ordinary 
peasant. More and more village dwellers are leaving the land and taking jobs in town factories 
and shops, but again education and specialized skills are seen as  primary requirements for this 
upward mobility. Peasants (or former peasants) who succeed in this competition are portrayed as  
having both the time and resources to engage in a variety of cultural and leisure time pursuits and 
hobbies, and these activities again set them apart from their neighbors. 
The message being conveyed to China's rural dwellers is fairly simple. Under the reform 
program, individuals and families can now become rich ahead of others and even leave the 
peasantry entirely, rather than being stuck within the egalitarian confines of the commune 
system. The way to succeed in this competition is not, in fact, to have a large number of children, 
a s  this would only depress family income (in the short run, a t  least) and make it difficult to invest 
sufficiently in any family member to produce the hoped for prosperity and mobility. Instead, it 
makes most sense in the reform era to have very few children, and to invest in the development of 
the human capital of members of a small family. Such investment is likely to lead to prosperity 
and success, and success will, in turn, bring the ability to expend family funds on consumer goods 
and leisure activities, rather than simply on feeding the family. And if the parents are willing to 
go as  far as to pledge to have only one child, that child is supposed to receive preferential 
treatment in developing his or her human capital in both schooling and jobs, making upward 
mobility even more likely. 
It is often argued that as the economy was transformed in the West, changes took place in 
the organization of work, family structure, and income levels, and that these produced heightened 
aspirations for mobility, consumption, and leisure. These heightened aspirations, in turn, led to a 
decline in desired family size, and these led finally to reduced fertility. What the publicity 
C 
surrounding the rural reforms in China seems to be trying to do is to alter this causal chain. By 
directly altering mobility, consumption and leisure aspirations it is hoped that desired family sizes 
will be reduced, even among villagers whose social envirozments have not yet been substantially 
transformed or modernized. 26 
Tables 6 and 7 about here 
To what extent has this effort to change peasant aspirations, and thereby change preferred 
family size, been successful? We will review some data from Chinese surveys that touch upon this 
question. In Table 6 we present preferred family size data from a 1983 survey of 525 married 
women of child-bearing age in Hongan County, Hubei Province. These data show that there is a 
clear relationship between the educational level of the women interviewed and the responses they 
gave to the question about how many children would be best. Women who had had a t  least a 
senior high school education were more likely to consider one child, and much less likely to prefer 
three children or more, than were other women. In Table 7 we examine the preferred family sizes 
of these women, classified by the occupations of their husbands. Among the non-peasant 
occupations there is little differentiation, but women with peasant husbands were much more 
likely to prefer three or more children, and much less likely to consider having only one child, than 
were women whose husbands had non-agricultural occupations. These tables give a t  least some 
26. To be sure, peasant incomes have increased markedly in recent years, but by any comparative standard they still remain at a 
very low level. And other structural elements of rural life, such as family organization and ritual life, have not in any 
meaningful sense been "modernized." 
support to the idea that individuals with more "modern" personal characteristics will have lower 
preferred family sizes. 27 
Tables 8 and 9 about here 
Data from the same study dealing with family economic conditions, on the other hand, tell a 
somewhat different story. In Table 8 we examine responses of these same women, classified now 
in terms of the level of per capita family income of their families. This table reveals a curvilinear 
pattern. Women from families with moderately high income, in the range 151-250 yuan per 
capita, were likely to prefer smaller families than were very poor women, but the highest average 
family size preference was expressed by women from the richest families surveyed. A more 
unambiguous pattern is shown in Table 9. There we can see that there is a positive correlation 
between preferred family size and the amount of housing space the family has. People with the 
most spacious housing, who may be assumed to be relatively well off, want to have larger families 
than anyone else. There is some ambiguity about these patterns, since age may be a confounding 
factor, with both prosperity and larger preferred family sizes more often found a t  later stages of 
the life cycle.28 In any case, it is clear that being better off than your neighbors, per se, is not 
something that leads automatically to lower fertility desires. The opposite may more nearly be 
the case.29 But the critical factor, according to the "anti-natal impact of the reforms" argument, is 
. not income, but rather consumption and other aspirations. 
Tables 10 and 11 about here 
Data from the same study can be used to examine the relationship between occupational 
and educational aspirations and preferred family size. In Table 10 we see the association between 
27. The Hubei data also show that younger women, unmarried women, and women living in two generation rather than three 
generation families, express desires for smaller numbers of children than do other women (tables not shown here). 
28. A separate table, not shown here, showed a positive relationship between age and preferred family sue. However, since the data 
for this study are not available outside of China, we were not able to perform multivariate analysis to untangle these 
relationships. 
29. Some Chinese demographers argue that in wealthy suburban vil laps the relationship between family income and preferred 
family size is being "reversed," so that better off families want fewer children than their neighbors. However, data are not yet 
available outside of China to substantiate this claim. 
the hoped for occupation of one's child or children and preferred family size. In general there is a 
moderate association between hoping that a child will rise above the peasantry and preferring a 
smaller number of children. The association between educational aspirations for one's children 
and preferred family size, as  shown in Table 11, is even more striking. In that table we can see 
not only a strong relationship between high educational aspirations and low preferred family size, 
but also that among those who hope that their child will attend college, a sizeable minority say 
that one child is best. So high aspirations for one's children do seem associated with acceptance of 
small family sizes, although it takes quite a high level of aspirations to win many converts for the 
one child ideal. 
Tables 12 and 13 about here 
We can gain further information about how rural people look upon having children by 
reviewing data from the 1986 survey in Danjiang County, Hubei Province, discussed earlier. In 
that study both rural and urban respondents were asked about the specific advantages and 
disadvantages of having more children. In Table 12 we present the responses dealing with the 
advantages. (Multiple responses were allowed.) For the most part these figures testify to rural 
residents not yet having developed very "modern" attitudes in regard to children. We see that 
significantly more rural respondents than urban ones mentioned old age support, continuity of the 
family line, family labor power, and the strength of the lineage as  advantages of having more 
children, while significantly fewer rural respondents mentioned the children a s  helping to improve 
relations between the spouses or as  being enjoyable to interact with per se. This pattern of 
responses must be profoundly troubling to advocates of the view that the reforms are generating 
modernized orientations in regard to children in rural areas. 
The figures in Table 13 present a little more encouragement to such advocates, however. 
When asked what the disadvantages of having more children were, rural respondents again had 
somewhat different views than urban respondents. There are a number of interesting patterns 
visible in the table, including the fact that rural respondents were more concerned about the cost 
of raising children. (Objectively it costs more to raise a child in the city, and it is usually argued 
that rural children can become net contributors to family income a t  a relatively early age.) But 
the figure that leaps out of the table a t  you is the fact that 70% of the rural respondents, but only 
9% of the urban ones, mention concern over the future success of children as  a major disadvantage 
of having more children. Taken together these tables suggest that, while peasants may continue 
to hold a number of traditional orientations in regard to childbearing, these may be a t  least 
partially counter-balanced by a very strong concern abow the cost of raising children and the 
difficulty of ensuring their future success. If these concerns are general and strong enough, they 
may help to provide an attitudinal basis for smaller preferred family sizes. 
Tables 14 and 15 about here 
But how widespread in the Chinese countryside are elevated aspirations for children? If 
they are confined to only a small segment of the peasantry, perhaps only the new rich peasants, 
they cannot be expected to be very important in the overall effort to reduce the preferred family 
size of China's villagers. In Tables 14 and 15 we return to the 1983 study in Hongan County to 
examine this question. In Table 14 we report the responses to the question, "In the future, what 
kind of person would you wish your son (or daughter) to become?" (In Chinese the implication of 
occupational destination is clear.) We can see in that table that very few respondents wished their 
children to end up as peasants, particularly in the case of sons. Most want their children to a t  
least rise into the ranks of the workers, but a significant minority wish for even higher mobility.30 
When the same women were asked, "How much schooling do you hope your son (or daughter) will 
receive?" their replies were even more ambitious. Clear majorities hoped that their children would 
go on to college, and for sons the figure was an astonishing 70%! Very few aspired to what has 
been the lot of most peasants up until now--to complete primary school a t  best. These tables 
30. It might be argwed that in socialist and egalitarian China the rhetoric of upward mobility is not appropriate, since all lines of 
work are seen of equal value. However, occupational prestige surveys conducted in China recently show clearly the same general 
rank ordering pattern as in other societies, with peasants being at, or near, the bottom. See Nan Lin and Wen Xie, "Occupational 
Prestige in Urban China," American Journal of Sociology, forthcoming. 
demonstrate that high aspirations for one's children are not confined to a small number of peasant 
families, but are extraordinarily widespread, a t  least in Hongan County. 
We don't have comparable figures from many other areas, but the limited data available 
seem to present a similar picture. For example, in four other Hubei counties surveyed in 1981 
61% of the rural respondents hoped their children could attend college, 38% hoped they could 
finish secondary school, and only 1% said they would be satisfied with primary s ~ h o o l i n g . ~ ~  The 
other data we have on aspirations for children all come from urban areas, but they suggest if 
anything even higher levels of aspirations in the cities.32 
We do not have detailed data on other forms of aspirations, such as  for consumption and 
leisure activities. But the limited data available on aspirations for children suggest an interesting 
interpretation. First, the figures reviewed here do lend some credibility to the "anti-natal impact 
of the reforms" argument. For example, the figures in Tables 14 and 15 do suggest that having 
lofty aspirations for one's children is very common among peasants in China in the reform era. 
And we have already seen that having high aspirations for children, particularly high educational 
aspirations, is associated with stating a preference for a small family, and even for the approved 
single child family. So there seem to be elements in rural opinion trends that are conducive 
toward reduced family size  preference^.^^ 
On the other hand, what these surveys also suggest is that the peasants interviewed were 
being wildly unrealistic, even if one makes the most optimistic assessments of the prospects for 
31. Gu Shengzu, "An Exploration into Rural Fertility Desires," op. cit 
32. For example, a Shanghai study of 158 parents of only children found that 18 hoped their child would graduate from secondary 
school, 83% hoped for college degrees, and 168 aspired to advanced degrees. See Xue Suzhen, e t  al., "The Family Education of 
Only Children," in Chen Kewen and Qu Qingyun, eds., Collected Essays on the One Child Question, (in Chinese), Beijing: Chinese 
Population Problems Research Group, 1985, pp. 197-8. A survey of 401 parents of only children in Qizhou, a county town in 
Hubei, found an astounding 48% who wanted their children to go on to graduate school. In the Shanghai and Qizhou studies only 
1-11% of the parents of only children chose "worker" as the desired occupation for their child, and even for parents with more 
than one child over 705  were hoping for prestigious white collar occupations. (Qizhou data from Gu Shengzu's survey file.) 
33. To be sure, we don't have comparable survey data for earlier points in time, and we can't be certain of how the levels of 
aspirations reported here would compare with what would have been found, say, in the 1960s or 1970s. And there are lots of 
traditional Chinese sayings that encourage lofty aspirations-for example, "Hope a son can become a dragon, and hope a daughter 
can become a phoenix" (wang zi cheng long, wang nu cheng feng). But we doubt that the average peasant ever had the sort of 
high hopes testified to in these tables, and there is some evidence that expectations in the immediately preceding period were 
much lower. For example, one ethnographic study of a Guangdong village at the end of the 1970s argued that the policies 
pursued during the Cultural Revolution had largely eliminated the thirst for education in rural areas. See Steven Mosher, Broken 
Earth. New York: The Free Press, 1983, Chap. 5. -
China's reform program. This is, after all, a society in which about 80% of the population are 
peasants, and that figure is not very likely to be reduced to 25% within a generation. It is also a 
society in which less than 4% of young people of college age are admitted to a university, with 
most of these being graduates of urban schools, and it is highly improbable that a generation from 
now 65% of rural youths will be admitted to college. 
The unrealistic nature of these aspirations suggests that the Chinese government is taking 
what may be a risky gamble. The authorities are encouraging rural people to develop high 
aspirations for themselves and their children. Such aspirations do have a number of positive 
consequences. They are seen as  motivating peasants to work hard and be innovative economically 
and encouraging their children to study hard in school and strive to get ahead. And they also are 
expected to promote a desire for fewer children. High aspirations may make small family size 
preferences possible, but in order to try to make having only one or two children acceptable, no 
matter what the sex of those children, a level of aspirations is being fostered that cannot 
realistically be satisfied. In the short run these heightened aspirations may help to counteract the 
pronatal impact of the revival of family farming and make small family sizes more acceptable. 
But in the long run there is considerable danger that when aspirations are not satisfied problems 
will arise. For example, given aspirations of this sort, where will the diligent peasants and highly- 
motivated factory workers of the next generation come from? So the enforcement of the one child 
policy may be made somewhat easier by these opinion trends, but the cost, in terms of mass 
dissatisfaction in later years, may be considerable. 
Conclusions 
The data reviewed in this paper are from scattered locales, and many of the studies did not 
use the best research methodology. Still, the studies reviewed here are suggestive of several 
conclusions. We noted clear evidence that in only a decade China had made the transition from 
levels of fertility typical of the third world td levels much closer to those of advanced industrial 
societies, and we commented that this shift offered proof, if evidence is still needed, of the 
possibility of bringing about a "demographic transition" long before high levels of "modernization" 
have been reached. We also noted that in the 1980s there has been much less than full 
compliance with the official one child policy, although the percentage of single parity births is quite 
high in comparative terms. In part this lack of full compliance reflects the fact that although 
family size preferences have no doubt decreased, still very few people, even in urban areas, would 
prefer to have only a single child. Two children would be acceptable to most people in both rural 
and urban areas, but only if those two were a boy and a girl. Thus if underlying family size 
preferences were the only influence on fertility behavior, we can assume that considerably more 
women than are currently doing so would be having not only second children, but also third and 
higher parity births. 
The effort to promote the one child goal consists not only of applying administrative 
measures to keep underlying family size preferences from being expressed. In addition, there are 
strenuous efforts to change these underlying preferences. These involve primarily convincing 
families that their interests can be best advanced by having small, rather than large, numbers of 
children, and particularly by having only one. And the central element of this strategy is the 
effort to raise popular aspirations for social mobility, education, consumption, and leisure. 
.. From the data reviewed here it appears that some success has been achieved in this effort. 
The level of aspirations visible, a t  least in regard to the future lives of one's children, seems 
extraordinarily high, and those people who do have high aspirations are more likely to feel that 
one child or two is best. In a sense, the challenge these developments present to the standard sort 
I 
of modernization-induced demographic transition argument is even greater than previously 
implied. I t  is not simply the case that fertility has dropped sharply in advance of substantial 
economic development. It  also appears that some success has been achieved in changing the 
attitudes and aspirations of even Chinese peasants so that these have been a t  least partially 
"modernized," again prior to the accomplishment of economic d e ~ e l o p m e n t . ~ ~  Both the fertility 
-- 
34. The major work on the modernization of attitudes is A. Inkeles and D. Smith, Becoming Modern, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 1974. 
change and the attitudinal transformation provide testimony to the sort of social engineering that 
is possible in an extraordinarily tightly organized society such a s  China. 
Still, there are troubling issues raised by these unprecedented changes. On the one hand, 
even with the major efforts that have been made, it has not been possible yet to reduce the 
underlying preferences of the great majority of Chinese below two, and so the one child campaign 
remains difficult to enforce. And this strategy has run into a dead end, since it is hard to imagine 
aspirations being raised even further in order to induce lower fertility. In addition, it is unclear 
whzt consequences will flow from the high levels of aspirations that the reform policies have 
engendered. If people perceive that they are having to make sacrifices by bearing fewer children 
than they would prefer, and if they later discover that the rewards that were supposed to come to 
those who made such sacrifices don't materialize, then the grounds will have been prepared for 
widespread disenchantment and anger. So in addition to having to worry about how to manage 
the negative feelings generated by the one child program itself in the short run, the authorities 
will have to worry about how in the long run to manage the expectation levels that have been built 
up as part of the effort to make the one child policy more acceptable. 
TABLE 1: PERIOD TOTAL FERTILITY RATE IN CHINA 
1950 1955 1960 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
NATION 5.8 6.3 4.0 5.8 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.2 2.6 
RURAL 6.0 6.4 4.0 6.4 4.0 3.6 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.5 3.0 
URBAN 5.0 5.7 4.1 3.3 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.4 
SOURCE: "Analysis of the National One-in-One Thousand Fertility 
Sample Survey," Renkou yu Jingji, (Population and Economy), 1983. p. 53-4. 
TABLE 2: BIRTH PARITY ORDER AND MEAN NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN CHINA 
REGION YEAR PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT 
FIRST SECOND THIRD MEAN 
BIRTHS BIRTHS OR HIGKER 
NATION 1970 20.7% 17.1% . 62.2% NA 
1977 30.9 24.6 44.6 NA 
1981 46.6 25.4 28.1 2.10 
1982 51.6 24.2 24.2 1.96 
1984 55.5 25.0 19.5 1.74 
1985 50.2 30.1 19.7 1.79 
URBAN 
. ., 
RURAL 1981. 42.0% 27.0% 3 1.0% 2.20 
1982 46.5 26.5 27.0 2.08 
1984 51.1 27.2 21.7 1.92 
1985 44.3 33.0 22.7 2.01 
SOURCE: Social Statistics Section, State Statistical Bureau. Materials 
on Chinese Social Statistics, (in Chinese), Beijing: Chinese &itistical 
Press, 1985, p. 34; Cheng Du, "Changes in Fertility Desires and Fertility 
after the Economic Reform," (in ~hinese) ,  paper presented a t  the 
Workshop on the Impact of the Economic Reform on Population, 1986, p. 29. 
TABLE 3: FAMILY SIZE PREFERENCES IN SELECTED AREAS OF CHINA 
YEAR REGION NUMBER OF CHILDREN PREFERRED 
NONE ONE TWO THREE FOUR+ MEAN N 
Rural or Suburban Percentage 




1984 Guizhou Minority7 0.2 7.2 18.7 73.9 3.90 850 
1982 Fujian Fishermen8 0.7 12.1 46.5 40.8 3.24 282 
1980 Beijing Military 90.0 10.0 1.10 12109 
1980 Beijing Youthlo 1.9 23.5 72.7 1.9 1.75 1071 
SOURCES: See Next Page 
SOURCES: TABLE 3: (all in Chinese) 
1. Chen Shengli, Research into the Relationship between Fertility and 
Living Standards in Jilin Province, unpublished report from the second 
collaborative research project between China and Japan, 1985. 
2. Cheng Du, "Changes in Fertility Desires and Fertility after the 
Economic Reform," op. cit. 
3. Song Sanyang, "Fertility Desires and Rural Population Control," 
unpublished senior thesis, Wuhan University Population Institute, 1986. 
4. Liu Xian, "Analysis of the Internal Mechanisms Mediating between 
Fertility Desires and Income Levels," Renkou, (Population), no. 3, 1983. 
-5. Hong Lianghua, Chen Jialin, et  al., "The Birth Motivations and Needs 
of Married Youths," RRnkou yu Jingji, no. 1, 1984. 
6. Chen Jialin and Luo Bowei, "Research on Birth Motivations and Needs 
of Unmarried Youths," Renkou yu Jingji, no. 3: 1985. 
7. Hu Xuehui, "A Study of Multi-parity in Anxu District in Guizhou 
Province," unpublished MA thesis, Sociology Department, Beijing 
University, 1985. 
- 
8. Guo Shenyang, "The Population State in a Fishing Village and Family 
Size Desires of Fishing People, Xibei Renkou, (Northwest Population), 
no. 4, 1983. 
9. "Investigation Report on the Family Planning Ideology of 12,000 
Youths," Renkou yu Jingji, no. 2, 1981. 
10. Zhang Ziyi, et al., Fertility Desires of Chinese Youths, Tianjin: 
Tianjin People's Press, 1982. 
TABLE 4: FAMILY SIZE PREFERENCES OF HUBEI WOMEN OF CHILDBEARING AGE 
YEAR REGION NUMBER OF CHILDREN PREFERRED 
ONE TWO THREE FOUR+ MEAN N 
Percentage 
1983-4 EASTERN HILL AREA 1.9 50.4 47.7 
(Hongan, Guangji and 
Qichun Counties) 




1984-5 WESTERN MINORITY AREA 1.9 51.3 27.3 19.2 2.63 3 192 
( ~ i c h u a n , ~ a i f e n ~ , ~ n s h i  
Xianfeng, Jianshi,Badong 
and Xuanen Counties) 




1981 SOUTHERN MOUNTAIN AREA 1.7 26.6 42.7 29.1 2.99 361 
(Chongyang County) 
................................................................................................................................................................. 
198 1-6 TOTAL, ALL HUBEI 3.1 57.8 28.1 11.0 2.47 6912 
LOCALITIES SURVEYED 
SOURCE: 
Gu Shengzu's survey file. These surveys were conducted by students 
enrolled in the annual research practicums of the Training Class in 
Demography of the Population Institute, Wuhan University. Generally 
8-12 students were sent as survey teams to each county, where they 
selected villages representing a diversity of conditions in the county 
and then interviewed all women of childbearing ages in those villages. 
The Hongan and Danjiang county studies also included some urbanites 
selected from local factories. The surveys in the Western Minority Areas 
and the Northern Developed Area (rows 3 and 4 in the table) included 
married men aged 15-49 as well a s  women in those ages. 
TABLE 5: CHILD PREFERENCES IN DANJIANG COUNTY, HUBEI, 1986 
NUMBER AND SEX OF CHILDREN 
PREFERRED RURAL URBAN TOTAL 
Percentage 
One,don't care about sex 3.7% 7.2% 4.8% 
One girl 
One boy 
Two,don't care about sex 
Two girls 
Two boys 
One gir1,one boy 
Three,don7t care about sex 
Two boys,one 'girl 
Two girls,one boy 




- The interviews included in Table 4 for.Danjiang County, which 
were conducted in 12 villages and 9 urban workshops in that 
county. The figures in this table include 661 married women and 
. 439 married men of childbearing ages (15-49). From the survey 
file of Gu Shengzu. 
TABLE 6: PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN, BY MOTHER'S EDUCATIONAL LEVEL 
EDUCATION PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN 
ONE TWO THREE FOUR+ MEAN 
Percentage 
Senior high or more 11 8 5 4 1.9 
Junior high school 6 7 9 15 2.1 
Primary school 4 7 1 2 4 1 2.2 
No schooling 4 7 1 2 2 3 2.3 
SOURCE: 
The interviews included in Table 4 from Hongan County, which 
were conducted with 525 randomly selected married women of 
childbearing age in 18 villages and 7 urban enterprises in 
that  county in 1983. From the survey file of Gu Shengzu. 
TABLE 7: PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN, BY HUSBAND'S OCCUPATION 
OCCUPATION PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN 
ONE TWO THREE FOUR+ MEAN 
Percentage 





Same a s  Table 6. 
TABLE 8: PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN, BY FAMILY PER CAPITA INCOME 
FAMILY INCOME PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN 
muan) ONE TWO THREE FOUR+ . MEAN 
Percentage 
50-80 5 7 3 13 9 2.2 
SOURCE: 
Same as Table 6. 
TABLE 9: PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN BY HOUSING SPACE 
HOUSING SPACE PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN 
(Per capita)* ONE TWO THREE FOUR+ MEAN 






*One room is approximately 22 square meters. 
SOURCE: 
Same as Table 6. 
TABLE 10: PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN BY CHILD OCCUPATION DESIRED 
DESIRED OCCUPATION PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN 





73 2 0 
SOURCE: 
Same a s  Table 6. 
TABLE 11: PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN BY DESIRES FOR CHILD EDUCATION 
DESIRED EDUCATION PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN 






6 7 2 
SOURCE:' 
Same a s  Table 6. 
TABLE 12: PERCEIVED ADVANTAGES OF MORE CHILDREN, BY RESIDENCE 
- 
ADVANTAGES RURAL URBAN 
* * **Percentage* * * * 
Economic support in old age 82% 43% 
Continuity of family line - 
To increase labor force 
To add power to kin group 
To add to spouse bond 
For enjoyment of parents 
(N) 
Note: Multiple choices allowed. 
SOURCE: 
Same as Table 5. 
TABLE 13: PERCEIVED DISADVANTAGES OF MORE CHILDREN, BY RESIDENCE 
DISADVANTAGES RURAL URBAN 
****percenta (?**** 
Financial cost 78% 64% 
Fatigue 
Less time for spouse 
Health hazards 
Problems in neighborhood 
Concern for children's future 
Concern for overpopulation 
(N) 
Note: Multiple choices allowed. 
SOURCE: 
Same as Table 5. 
TABLE 14: DESIRED FUTURE OCCUPATION FOR CHILDREN OF RURAL WOMEN 
DESIRED OCCUPATION SEX OF CHILD 
BOY GIRL 
"""*";*Percenta e**'4:*' 
Technician 33% 19% 
Worker 53 5 1 
Peasant 14 30 
SOURCE: 
Same as  Table 6, 400 rural women only 
TABLE 15: DESIRED EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN OF RURAL WOMEN 
DESIRED EDUCATION SEX OF CHILD 
BOY GIRL 
" * " 4: :]:percenta * * ' * " S: 
College 7 0% 58% 




Same as  Table 6, 400 rural women only. 
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